Zuzanna Dziuban **Landscape: Unpacking the Cultural Concept**

Robert Jan van Pelt **From the Last Hut of Monowitz to the Last Hut of Belsen**

Pavel Vařeka and Zdeňka Vařeková **Archaeology of Zigeunerlager: Initial Results of the 2016-2017 Investigation at the Roma Camp in Lety**

Rob van der Laarse **Lety Roma Camp: Discovering the Dissonant Narratives of a Silenced Past**

Andriana Benčic **Jasenovac and the Persistence of the Past**

Cord Pagenstecher **Through the City of Camps: Remembering Forced Labour in Berlin**
It is virtually impossible to comprehend the complex political, cultural and material dynamics of camps, whether as a means of (genocidal) violence or as locations of collective remembrance, without engaging with their spatial dimension and 'spatial effects'. Instead of being merely sites where violence is enacted and memorialized, the space and spatial organization of the camps are constitutive of their functioning. Spatial configurations and reconfigurations play a critical role when camps serve as instruments of confinement and extermination. Equally, in the aftermath of violence, space becomes an indispensable tool for shaping and articulating narratives about the former camps, for asserting their visibility or, indeed, their political, social and physical invisibilization. The close entanglement between the politics of memory and the politics of space is most apparent in the ways in which the transformations of the architectural and sculptural organization of memorial sites affect and govern the manner in which the camps are perceived, experienced, understood and remembered. However, it is also a driving force behind the processes of preservation, conservation, memorialization, and 'rediscovery' of the former camps (by memory activists, scholars or archaeologists), and those that lead to their reuse, concealment, covering over, or complete erasure. The spatial dynamics of campscapes and its various political/cultural/memorial/conceptual implications are the subject of the second issue of our e-journal. It brings together contributions that discuss this issue from the perspective of critical heritage studies, cultural studies, sociology, archaeology, architectural history, and digital humanities.

The first contribution, by Zuzanna Dziuban, retraces the cultural and disciplinary travels of the concept of ‘landscape’, in order to ask about its potential for capturing the productive spatiality of the camps, while the article by Robert Jan van Pelt offers an in-depth investigation into the history of, and postwar practices around, the most fundamental and indispensable architectural structure of the Nazi camps: the wooden prefabricated barrack hut. The contributions by Pavel Vařeka and Zdeňka Vařeková, and Rob van der Laarse, in turn, focus on the spatial, material and political dynamics of the Roma camp in the Czech village of Lety: officially liquidated and dismantled in 1943, in the 1970s the former camp became the location of an industrial pig farm, which continues to operate at the site to this very day. It was only after both articles were written – the first reporting on the archaeological research carried out at the site in 2016-2017, the second unpacking the dense memorial politics around it – that the Czech government approved a bill to close the farm, which will ultimately result in the whole area of the former camp being transformed into a memorial site. The contributions by Andriana Benčic and Cord Pagenstecher, addressing, respectively, the contested postwar history of the Jasenovac camp, and the myriad of bottom-up, decentralized practices aimed at reinscribing the memory of forced labour camps in Berlin, make manifest the various ways in which space can fashion memories and partake in the complex processes of its mediation and transmission.
LANDSCAPE: UNPACKING THE CULTURAL CONCEPT

The most common and also most traditional meaning of landscape, as employed in the disciplinary field of geography and in vernacular language, is that of physical surroundings. Its role as a carrier of a cultural concept can, however, be traced back development of Dutch landscape painting in the sixteenth century and its English successor in the subsequent two centuries. It was during this period, with the birth of linear perspective and the emergence of the genre of landscape painting, that ‘landscape’ gained cultural significance as a way of representing outer (mainly rural) reality. In art-historical research, landscape – referring simultaneously to the rural scene (a view to be depicted) and ‘rural scenery’ presented via the specific aesthetic means – came to denote a conceptual prism through which land and nature were perceived. It became a particular “framing convention”.

It was considered a representational practice organized by realist representation, with three-dimensional geometric space captured through a two-dimensional medium, and, most importantly, by the location of the viewer and painter outside of the represented scene (outsider’s perspective). In this way, the aesthetics of landscape painting was constructed as a derivative of the emergent ways of perceiving both the human subject and its spatial and material surroundings, namely the bifurcations of the ‘natural’ (such as gardens) and the man-made (built environment). In Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels’ words, “landscape is a [historically and socially specific] cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolizing surroundings” – i.e. a conceptual way of organizing reality projected onto physical and represented spaces.

It was only in the 1970s, however, that the process of “opening up and ‘unpacking’ the concept of landscape” began following the ‘discovery’ that landscape evinces neither a transparent mode of representing reality nor an innocent way of seeing. Rather, it was denounced as a thoroughly ideological concept called upon to represent and naturalize identifiable power relations. The analysis of the conditions behind the emergence of the idea of landscape in Western Europe (especially in 18th-century England) proposed by Raymond Williams in The Country and the City (1973), played a decisive role in initiating critical and politically informed reflection on the concept. Williams, who located the origins of the idea of landscape in shifts in attitudes towards nature that were motivated by changes in the broader socio-political and economic structural contexts, identified those conditions with the transformation of the politics of distribution, use, and control of the land introduced by capitalism. In his view, “the very idea of landscape implies separation and observation”. Based on the distinction between land and landscape, that is land as ‘productive’ and landscape as ‘aestheticized’ nature, landscape separates two ways of relating to it: agricultural production and aesthetic consumption. The latter, rarely enjoyed by those who work the land, has served predominantly as the privilege of estate owners, artists, entrepreneurs, industrialists, and visitors from the city. In this way, the concept of landscape came to implicate distance and aesthetic pleasure alike (associated also with the retreat from the city), and also visual as well as financial control over land. The ideological nature of the concept has, therefore, been intrinsically entwined with the fact that it represents and objectifies a particular class’s perspective to which, in the words of W.J.T. Mitchell, the “painted image [merely] gives cultural expression.”

The critical reading of landscape proposed by Williams inspired further multi- and interdisciplinary revisions of the concept. They have followed two main (spatial) directions oriented towards ‘lived’ and ‘representational’ landscapes. The first concept refers to landscape understood in terms of a lived relationship with space, of the experiences and meanings people ascribe to their physical and cultural surroundings; the second constructs landscape as a real, material space created by human labour, and its cultural representations. Adopted mainly in cultural geography and critical spatial theory, the perspective focusing on representational landscapes defines these as cultural products inevitably related to expressions of power and status. Cultural landscapes – built environments, architectural and urban structures, as well as their literal and visual representations – are the products of complex political, social, and cultural processes governed, and imposed, by those who have the power to define the ways in which social reality is shaped, and thus to determine the content and form of landscape representations. “Landscape represents the architecture of social class, gender, and race relations imposed by powerful institutions”, asserts Sharon Zukin. As a mix of built form and politically charged representation, landscape is, from this perspective, a spatial and, at the same time, a symbolic hegemonic production. In other words, the power to produce landscape is the power to define the meaning and stabilize the dynamics of spatial and social relations. In Studying Cultural Landscapes, Ian Black argues that (urban) architectural representations usually mirror dominant cultural formations – they embody particular ideologies and universalize dominant cultural experiences. It is in this sense that Zukin frames landscapes as ‘spatialities of the powerful’.

4 Hirsh, Landscape, 23
7 Mitchell, Imperial Landscape, 8.
12 Zukin, Landscapes of Power, 19.
The concept of lived landscape pertains, in turn, to the ways in which a sense of belonging and a sense of place are created and sustained by ‘ordinary’ users of landscapes. It encompasses “the creative and imaginative ways in which people place themselves within their environments”, how they experience, interpret and, frequently, contest them. Lived landscapes are humanized spaces, filled with meaning, constituted around and structured by spatial and cultural practices. As it informs research carried out in the field of cultural anthropology, human and cultural geography, and cultural studies, the concept of lived landscape therefore captures the complex dynamics through which spaces come to incorporate cultural values and identities, and become invested with collective and individual memories. In this way, the reconstructions and interpretations of more or less unreflexive, everyday experiences of space – through fieldwork and ethnographic description – draw attention and give voice to bottom-up and vernacular constructions of landscape created by ‘insiders’. Based on an assertion of their ability and right to produce space, this perspective reclaims ‘landscape’ for those who, according to the conceptualization proposed by Williams, have not previously been entitled to it.

The need to bring these two perspectives together in order to foreground the spatial dimension of landscape – thus far constructed mainly in terms of sights, texts, static representations or mere carriers of meaning – and to shift the focus from the question of what landscape means to “what it does”, was most powerfully voiced by the art historian W.J.T. Mitchell. His postulation, which brings to the fore the role of space as both a site of inscription of experiential, cultural and political representations and as a productive force in itself, was taken on and further developed by representatives of new cultural geography. Conceiving space not simply as a ‘container’, cultural product and/or vehicle for meaning-making, but also as an ‘agent’ actively partaking in the processes that shape and maintain social realities and specific configurations of power, opened up new conceptualizations of landscape. The idea that landscape is not only “a work” but that it also “works on the people who make it” – influences and shapes their actions and perceptions – established landscape as a process or activity: an ongoing exchange between social practices, spaces, and representations. In this way, landscape regained its three-dimensionality as a site and not merely a sight or a text. In the words of cultural geographer Don Mitchell, “landscape, in this sense, provides a context, a stage, within and upon which humans continue to work, and it provides boundaries (...) within which people remake themselves.” To put it bluntly, if the social reproduction of power guaranteed by representational landscapes is to be sustained, the dominant meanings encoded in them have to be continuously actualized by social-spatial practices: in order “to work”, landscape has to be lived, acted upon, and experienced.

Recently, this processual and generative perspective on landscape has also gained importance in scholarly reflection on entanglements between space and political violence. This refers, first and foremost, to the ways in which landscapes come to serve not only as locations but also as a means of terror, control or annihilation. In their 2014 publication, Estela Schindel and Pamela Colombo observe that “the utilization of space as an instrument in the deployment of state violence finds its supreme expression in creation of spaces of exception and, particularly, of concentration and extermination camps”. From this perspective, the camp constitutes the most powerful and the most disturbing epitome of the ‘productive’ dimension of both violence and space, and their role in producing and undoing political

15 See Mitchell, Imperial Landscape.
16 Mitchell, Cultural Geography, 102.
17 Ibid.
subjects. In a similar vein, conceptualizations of the former camps – expressed in the terms of *terrorscapes*¹⁹ and, as is the case in iC-ACCESS, *campscapes* – bring to the fore the importance of the camps’ spatial organization for the perpetuation of violence and inflicting dehumanization. Captured through the suffix -scape, the spatiality of the camps (as landscapes) becomes analytically inseparable from their functioning as juridical-political structures.

This pertains also to the afterlives of the camps in their still lingering material presence in the aftermath of war, genocide, and political violence. When transformed into sites of memory, museums and memorial landscapes, *campscapes* retain their processual dimensions and productive roles in such cases as environments for and tools of memory work. As cultural products established through processes of spatial and visual framing, organized according to specific compositions and spatial and visual orders, they serve as screens or sites of inscription of various hegemonic constructions of the past (and present). But as they stabilize and naturalize top-down narratives about the past they also become media of spatial organization aimed at mobilizing particular forms of memory work. *Campscapes* design and configure spatial practices and bodily movements while limiting the scope of potential uses and actions that can be undertaken or performed within their realm. Yet, in this case, there is always some scope for the visitors to decide whether the meanings encoded in the landscape will be relived, internalized and reproduced, or, on the contrary, reinterpreted, contested, or denied.

_Zuzanna Dziuban (University of Amsterdam)_

In December 2012, I found myself in the company of Rob van der Laarse, Carlos Reijnen, some other academics, a few cineastes, the visual artist Hans Citroen, and my wife Miriam Greenbaum, daughter of Auschwitz survivor Jakub Grünbaum, on the threshold of a ruined barrack near the Polish city Oświęcim, known for being site of the former Auschwitz I (Main Camp) and Auschwitz II (Birkenau) concentration camps. For almost a quarter century I had visited Oświęcim annually, and I was convinced the place did not hold any more surprises. Yet as we set out to visit the site of the former Buna synthetic rubber factory, Hans, who knew the area well, suggested we make a detour and visit a small farmhouse not far from the factory site.

We arrived at a site in the area that had been occupied by Auschwitz III (Monowitz), the Auschwitz satellite built to house the inmates working on the construction of the Buna plant. The camp site itself had not been included in the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum. We found half of a barrack hut, partly ruined, that was attached to a small farmhouse. In the aftermath of World War II, many Poles expelled from Oświęcim had returned home to find their lands covered by camps and their houses destroyed. They also discovered, however, that it was easy to dismantle the wooden barrack huts used in concentration camps and re-assemble them elsewhere. Thus many huts became provisional dwellings or workshops. Most of these recycled buildings had rotted away in the 1960s. But somehow one had survived in Monowice.

We entered and found ourselves in the partly ruined building. I recognized the structure: “Good, an authentic RAD-Mannschaftsbaracke Type RL IV [Reich Labor Service Crew Barrack Type RL IV],” I thought, clutching to the safety offered by identifying our discovery with its proper label. I noticed inscriptions on the beams and walls summoning inmates to adhere to certain standards of hygiene, which suggested the barrack had been an infirmary.

“This is Primo Levi’s barrack,” Hans told us with the self-confidence that is uniquely his. “Which one?” “The barrack of the ten days…” “You mean Ka-Be?” We looked at one another, realizing in astonishment that this ruined and rotting structure might have been Ka-Be, short for Krankenbau [infirmary] – the most important site in Primo Levi’s memoir If This Is a Man (1947), a key text in the bibliography of the Holocaust and the education of the members of our group. The suggestion that this barrack hut might have been Ka-Be had a profound impact: we all knew, with greater or lesser clarity, that we stood at a site where universe of the imagination composed of words met a universe of observation composed of space and matter.

As I reconsidered this barrack hut, I also became acutely aware of how little I knew about the history of the RAD-Mannschaftsbaracke. When I returned to Canada, I began to investigate the literature on prefabricated barrack huts built in Germany and German-ruled Europe between 1933 and 1945. A few young scholars in Germany, most notably Axel Dossmann, Jan Wenzel, Kai Wenzel and Ralph Gabriel, had mapped some of the terrain in several publications, but it appeared that their very valuable contributions to the topic had not yet led to a monograph on the history of the wooden prefabricated barrack hut, such as the one I had entered in Monowice.

Reflecting on the prospects and problems of a research project on the barrack hut, I realized it might be energized by the contradiction between the very marginality of the building type as an object of consideration by architects, clients, historians and theorists, and its historical impact in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century. Until about 1970, major building types such as temples, churches, palaces, town halls, theatres and libraries were the focus of sustained theoretical consideration and historical study. This reflected the fact that these building types provided the architectural profession with work and income, while architectural historians were thus given clear examples of the evolution of styles and with built, archival and literary evidence.
Minor, vernacular building types – barns, stables, cottages, market stalls and so on – attracted little attention: these had seldom been built by notable architects, while their construction had left little evidence with which scholars could work.

This tendency also applies to the common hut – the usually crude and bare single-story, single room building, constructed from readily available building materials (wooden boards, logs, branches, loam or stones for walls, and boards, shingles, straw, turf, skins, canvas, matting or cardboard for the roof), and without permanent foundations. Both laymen and scholars consider the wooden hut the oldest and most universal form of architecture. Their logic is based on the general availability of wood in most parts of the world and the relative simplicity of using wood for construction. Yet their assumption is not supported by much material evidence: wooden buildings, unlike stone ones, have relatively short lifespans and tend to disappear without a trace. The sorry state of the wooden hut in Monowice is a case in point.

In the year that followed our visit to Ka-Be, I began to sketch out a biography of the barrack hut – a version of the common hut that did make world history. It is the story of a lightweight hybrid between a shack, a tent and a conventional building that was easy to erect, take down and transplant part by part. It is a story of a standardized, serially made product that offered instant shelter to those forced by design or circumstance to survive away from home: soldiers; ill people forced into quarantine; laborers working on infrastructural projects or in resource-extractive industries in sparsely populated areas; foreign laborers; people who had become homeless as the result of earthquakes, great fires or bombing raids; and prisoners. It is the story of a building type that always remained a product of necessity without ever becoming an object of aspiration or, for that matter, affection.

The barrack hut entered the world stage with a bang in 1854. British and French expeditionary forces in the Crimea proved unable to conquer Sevastopol and were forced to lay siege to the city. Thanks to a telegraph connection, the British public learned that soldiers were freezing in their tents, and a few British builders set out to make simple, prefabricated huts for use in the Crimea. The British and French governments bought into the plan. A design was produced within days and the parts became available in weeks. Shipped to the Black Sea with great publicity, the barrack huts saved the expeditionary forces. At the same time, both the British and French governments decided to create large camps consisting of barrack huts at home to provide realistic training conditions for the militia that provided the reserves for the standing armies. The 2,000 barrack huts built at Aldershot near London and Châlons near Paris became the focus of public interest. Finally, after it became clear that sick and wounded soldiers lodged in field hospitals consisting of flimsy barrack huts healed much more quickly than those housed in large brick or stone hospitals, the barrack hut became a cure-all in every emergency situation.

The American Civil War demonstrated the full remedial potential of the barrack hut. The American Army adopted the structure, standardized it and made it the backbone of a system of managing mass casualties, including aid stations, field hospitals and general hospitals. Military surgeons were able to obtain extraordinary medical results in these hospitals, with many making a direct link between the design of the buildings and patients’ dramatically lower morbidity and mortality rates. In addition, the barrack hut proved a panacea when, for the first time in
history, armies were left with tens of thousands of prisoners of war. The Union Army built large prisoner-of-war camps, each consisting of up to a hundred barrack huts surrounded by a wooden stockade.

The experience of the Civil War was closely studied in Europe. The highly professional German military medical system made the barrack hut a basic building block of its infrastructure, and, after the creation of an experimental and somewhat upgraded civilian version at the Charité Hospital in Berlin, it became the model for patient wards in Central and Eastern Europe. During the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) military barrack-hut-hospitals and hatted prisoner-of-war camps were built all over Germany. In contrast to the United States, where all barrack huts followed one standard type, every German municipality or army jurisdiction commissioned its own design, with the proliferation of different versions of the barrack hut providing opportunities for research and comparison.

In the decades that followed the Franco-Prussian War, barrack huts multiplied: they were used as quarantine hospitals for epidemic diseases, colonies for children infected with tuberculosis, temporary settlements in the colonies, and emergency shelters after the 1908 Messina earthquake. An important new development was the search, initiated by German Empress Augusta and taken up by the International Committee of the Red Cross, for a barrack hut that could not only be prefabricated, easily transported and quickly built, but also easily taken apart and reconstructed elsewhere. The patented design by Danish tentmaker Johan Gerhard Clemens Døcker won the first prize in a large international competition organized in 1885, and the purchase of Døcker’s patent by the German firm Christoph & Unmack marked the beginning of barrack hut production on an industrial scale.

Until 1914, the barrack hut’s reputation was largely benign: it provided instant shelter for those who needed it. But the outbreak of war, the mass arrest of so-called enemy aliens, the flood of civilian refugees from Central and Eastern Europe dislocated by conflict, and the capture of hundreds of thousands of soldiers led to the construction of vast internment camps, each of which consisted of an overcrowded compound with hundreds of badly maintained and ever more cheaply built barrack huts surrounded by barbed-wire fences. The public perception of the barrack hut changed: the dominant association became one of squalid captivity.

The Nazis tried to change this when they came to power. They aimed to alter society radically by creating many networks of camps dedicated to bringing Germans into line, in order to discipline, mobilize, militarize and heroize the German nation. There were also camps for the construction crews working on German highways and the fortified defense works in the west known as the Siegfried Line. The basic building block of all of these camps was the RAD-Mannschaftsbaracke, a perfected version of the Doecker Barbie, which was now produced under license by sawmills all over Germany. In 1935, the RAD-Mannschaftsbaracke Doecker was adopted by the German Army, and two years later the SS placed a first order for RAD barrack huts for use in its concentration camps.

The Second World War saw the zenith and nadir of the barrack hut. From the summer of 1940 onward, most civilian construction in Germany came to a halt, and from 1942 onward, this ban was absolute. The only exception applied to four different variations of the original Doecker Barbie, which now came to dominate the landscape and cityscape of German-controlled Europe. Hundreds of thousands of these barrack huts were produced, housing soldiers, forced laborers, civilians bombed out of their homes, and concentration-camp inmates. Thus the wooden barrack hut and its immediate context, the camp, became a crucial stage for the key drama of the twentieth century: The Holocaust.

The post-war fate of the hundreds of thousands of barrack huts involved a somewhat embarrassed re-use followed by demolition. The fate of one barrack hut in Bergen Belsen stands out, however. When units of the
British Army entered the camp on April 15, 1945, they encountered a catastrophe: everywhere they saw unburied corpses and sick and dying prisoners – mostly Jews – living in overcrowded, filthy barrack huts. The soldiers made a heroic effort to bury the dead and move the living to a nearby army base. On May 19, the last of the survivors left the Belsen compound. Immediately thereafter, a Vickers Armstrong MK II Universal Carrier drove toward the now abandoned wooden barrack huts and used a flame-thrower to set all but one ablaze.

The burning of the last barrack hut happened two days later with a bit of staging orchestrated by the commanding officer, Colonel H.W. Bird. He arranged for a 1933 model of the War Ensign, which carried an image of the Prussian Iron Cross, to be nailed to the structure, along with a large portrait of Hitler. And he ordered the erection of a large stake in front of the barrack hut, one which was to also serve as a flag pole. Sergeant Bert Hardy, who had been photographing in Belsen for a month, carefully set the rest of the scene for posterity. The barrack hut itself was soaked in gasoline and, after a few words from Col. Bird and volley shots fired as a salute to the dead, set on fire. The crowd cheered, the Union Jack floated out from the top of the flagpole, and the shutter of Sgt. Hardy’s Leica clicked.

That desperate *auto-da-fé* ended a relatively limited act of physical erasure – sixty barrack huts burned – and initiated a larger process of forgetting, at least as far as barrack huts were concerned. Sgt. Hardy’s picture suggests that this barrack hut, and by implication all the Belsen barrack huts, deserved to disappear from human memory. The Allied discovery of the horrors contained within the barrack huts marked a moment of truth from which the imagination has not yet recovered. In burning the barrack hut, the British soldiers sought to make a clear statement: we need to move on; everyone needs to move on; let’s erase a terrible, inassimilable past. But, as we have learned, things are never that simple: a second generation arose that felt burdened by that very past while also feeling short-changed because they had somehow missed the greatest event of the twentieth century.

This, then, may help to explain why I began to visit Auschwitz in the late 1980s, and why I continue to do so today. It explains why I have read and reread Primo Levi’s writings as if they were Holy Scripture, and why, in December 2012, my heart skipped a beat in that ruined and rotting barrack hut when Hans Citroen announced: “This must be Primo Levi’s barrack.”

Robert Jan van Pelt (University of Waterloo)
In recent decades, former Nazi labour, concentration, and extermination camps have become the subject of intense archaeological research. Investigations at the locations of the Holocaust, mapping of campscapes and studying their materiality – based on archaeological techniques, including novel, mostly non-invasive methods – have come to represent a dynamically evolving field of research within modern archaeology. Nevertheless, until recently, those attempts have rarely been directed at assessing the material testimony of the Romani Porajmos. The first project of this kind was undertaken at the former Roma camp in Lety in the autumn and winter of 2016-2017. It was carried out by archaeologists from the Department of Archaeology at the University of West Bohemia in Plzen within the framework of iC-ACCESS. A joint fieldwork project with students from the University of Amsterdam followed in July 2017.

Lety served as one of two internment camps for Roma that were established in 1942 in the Protectorat Böhmen und Mähren [Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia], a part of Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia. Czech Romani were concentrated there before being sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau. Around 90% of the prewar Romani community did not survive the Holocaust. As early as 1942, legal measures, mirroring those that laid the ground for the system of prosecution of Sinti and Roma in the Third Reich were implemented in the Protectorate. On 9 March 1942, an ordinance prescribing preventive custody of “Gypsies and people travelling like Gypsies” was issued. On June 22, 1942, the General Commander of the non-uniformed Protectorate police ordered all “Gypsies, mixed Gypsies and people of Gypsy lifestyle” to register. According to registration lists created at that time, a total of 6,500 people were sent to both Zigeunerlager set up on August 1, 1942, in Lety (Písek district) for the territory of Bohemia and in Hodonín (Blansko district) for the territory of Moravia.2

The camp was located around two kilometres southeast from the village of Lety. It was erected at the site of a former penal labour camp, operational between 10 August 1940, and 31 July 1942. From August 1942, 1,309 Sinti and Roma passed through the camp. 327 of them died at the site, including 28 of the 36 children born in Lety. The Protectorate Police and Gendarmerie oversaw transport to the camps and were in charge of its operations. Prisoners’ belongings (mostly wagons, horses, money, and jewelry made of precious metals) were confiscated upon arrival; men, women and children under 12 were separated. The inmates were forced to perform labour in the vicinity of the camp, including road construction, logging, working in quarries and agriculture. Due to very poor hygiene and severe malnutrition, prisoners’ health deteriorated quickly, leading to the outbreak of a typhus epidemic, which cost the lives of many inmates. Their bodies were first buried at a local parish cemetery and from January 1943 at the newly established camp cemetery nearby. The first transport from Lety to extermination camp Auschwitz II (Birkenau) took place on 4 December 1942; the second on 7 May 1943.3

The camp covered an area of 6,600 m². Due to its overpopulation, a triangular extension was added in 1942 to the earlier part of the camp that was based on a rectangular plan. The original camp consisted of four wings of wooden cabins (2.5 x 3 meters) and one large barrack (9 x 12 meters) lining the central yard, a kitchen, a cellar, some workshops, a storage area, dispensary, washroom/laundry, detention quarters, garage, shed and latrine. An administrative building was located outside of the fenced-in area, along with five small buildings, which housed camp guards. Later on, three additional larger barracks and some other facilities were erected at the camp. As a result of the typhus epidemic and emptying of the camp during the summer of 1943, all wooden buildings were burned and the area disinfected with chlorine lime. The camp was officially liquidated on 8 August 1943.4

According to oral history research carried out in parallel to archaeological investigations at Lety, in May 1945 the Red Army used the area of the former camp as a gathering place for German prisoners of war. The witnesses claim that the graves of some POWs are still located in the nearby forest. According to some testimonies, the camp was also used as a training area by the Czechoslovak Army soon after the war. As we learn from the 1960s documentary Nezapomeňte na tohle děvčátko [Don’t forget this little girl], devoted to the extermination of Czech Romani, the remains of the former camp, ditches and debris from buildings were still visible on the surface

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2 Ctibor Nečas, Nad osudem českých a slovenských cikánů v letech 1939-1945, Brno 1981.


15 years after the war. Nevertheless, in the early 1970s, the local Communist government decided to establish a large, state-owned pig farm at the location of the former camp. Built in three phases, in 1972-1974, in 1978 and in 1985, it consisted of 13 big halls housing 1000 pigs each. Privatized after 1989, the industrial pig farm is still located at the site – causing justified indignation and heated debates. Even though the camp cemetery was declared a cultural monument and a memorial was established at Lety in the 1990, the government has not found a solution to this embarrassing situation. As a result, the area of the former camp has still not been listed as a monument or transformed into a place of commemoration. Due to the presence of the fenced farm complex, it remains inaccessible to the public.

The archaeological research carried out in 2016 and 2017 focused on five objectives: 1) determining the exact location of the camp, 2) assessment of anthropogenic remains on the surface in the area around the camp (diameter 0.4 km), 3) detecting the character of archaeological remains of the camp and establishing the possibilities for interpretation in order to identify the camp structure, 4) collecting material evidence which may elucidate everyday life in the camp and 5) determining the exact location of the camp cemetery and its layout. The first phase of the research, conducted in the autumn and winter of 2016-2017, was based on non-invasive techniques, such as surface and topographic surveys, and geophysical surveys. Complementary methods helped give a more complete picture – aerial scanning data processing (LiDAR), documentary and visual evidence, and analysis of post-WWII aerial images. During the second phase, carried out between 4 and 14 July 2017, we conducted trial excavations. Small-scale sondage of the accessible north-western part of the camp tested results of non-destructive research methods and sampled the archaeological situation.

5 Krátký film 1960, Studio dokumentárního řízení, Praha.
6 Jana Pařízková, Bývalý internační tábor pro Romy v Lettech u Písku a jeho poválečná historie, Romano Džaniben jevend 2008, 98–118.
Aerial photographs taken by the Czechoslovak Army in 1949 and 1951 captured well the visible remains of the camp outline represented by what are probably vegetation marks. Georeferencing of these images enabled us to project the camp onto a contemporary map and localize it, showing that around 90% of its area is situated within the pig farm built in the 1970s and 1980s. However, only the south-eastern part of the camp has been built over with modern buildings and its largest part is located in the unbuilt north-western area of the farm, represented by a meadow. The western part of the camp is especially recognizable on historic aerial photographs, consisting of a rectangular plan as well as the administrative buildings, and some components of the eastern triangular section are also evident. No visible remains of the camp have been preserved at the site. A surface survey of the area around the camp within a 400-meter diameter detected numerous anthropogenic features, especially in the wooded area on the northern and eastern side.

The results were compared with the digital terrain model based on aerial scanning data (provided by the State Administration of Land Surveying and Cadastre) and processed in GIS (ArcMap). Except for old roads (hollowed ways), field systems and the remains of quarry pits, which could be dated back to the medieval, early modern and modern periods, two groups of relief formations were revealed that can be linked to the camp. The first is represented by a system of trenches (field fortifications) situated in close proximity to the north of the camp, which can be related to activities having occurred in this area after the Second World War (Red Army camp or Czechoslovak Army post-war training). The second was found in the area of Lety Memorial where, according to documentary evidence, a camp cemetery is located 250 meters to the south-east. A total of four interventions (45 m²) in the north-western part of the camp area outside the pig farm demonstrated that its archaeological remains are very well preserved only a few centimetres beneath the current surface. It is apparent that no lowering of the original terrain level or any disturbance occurred in the studied area after the camp was abandoned. Sondage also confirmed the results established both by geophysical survey and by projecting historic aerial photographs onto the contemporary map. The stone foundation of the administrative building and its floor level were uncovered outside the fenced area (intervention 3). Two cuts (intervention 1 and 4) exposed the remains of the western row of a small barracks and part of the camp yard. According to historic photographs, wooden cabins (2.5 x 3 m) resting on stone brick footings were lined on both sides by drainage ditches. The surface of the yard was formed by a layer of soil-clay containing several lost or discarded artefacts. Remains of a communication line indicated by a thin stratum of sand, and marked by fencing of some kind, were detected along the front part of the barracks, behind the ditch. Burnt remains of wooden structures as well as the presence of lime (CaCO₃) provide confirmation of the testimony from documentary evidence about the burning of camp buildings and disinfection of the area. Burnt debris contained several iron artefacts used in the barracks’ construction along with glass from the windows of the barracks, but also artefacts that may be linked to prisoners, mostly dress accessories. Small glass beads found in this context further strengthen existing written evidence that girls and women lived in this part of the camp. Textile fragments, probably prisoners’ clothing, were found in the fill of drainage ditches and the yard surface layer, suggesting wet conditions of some archaeological strata. The last permission to enter the pig farm was not given, only the north-west part outside the fenced area could be surveyed. Results showed remains of the administrative building and the western wing of small barracks corresponding closely with historical aerial images. Geophysical survey of the cemetery detected several anomalies, which may represent grave pits, including two large rectangular features reaching 4x5 meters and 5x6 meters.

7 World War II aerial photographs of Lety area have not been ascertained yet.
intervention (1) sampled the entrance area of the camp, revealing the original surface and what are probably remains of fencing.

The research determined the exact location of the Lety camp using historic aerial images, non-destructive methods and trial excavations. Projection of the 1949 and 1951 aerial photographs onto contemporary maps shows that the camp was mostly situated within the pig farm, although only a small part was superimposed and thus very likely destroyed by farm buildings. Most of the area covered by the camp is located in the (deliberately?) unbuilt north-western part of the pig farm complex, which was not accessible to the research team, although it also stretches to the neighbouring ground. Thus, field activities focused on the north-western section of the camp outside the pig farm. Geophysical survey and small-scale excavations of this part of the camp determined its location based on historic aerial photographs. Excavations demonstrated that archaeological remains have been very well preserved, making it possible to relate them to individual parts of the camp structure. A total of four interventions uncovering less than 1% of the camp area sampled the administrative building, the western row of prisoners’ barracks, the yard and the entrance area. Because the wooden buildings met their end by way of intentional burning, the debris contains a lot of constructional details in-situ but also artefacts that can be linked to prisoners.

Surface surveys focusing on the area around the camp revealed a number of earlier anthropogenic features (medieval, early modern and modern) but also a complex of field fortifications that may reflect subsequent activities in this area that followed the desertion of the camp. Non-destructive surveys also took place around the area of the supposed cemetery 800 m South-East of the camp where the Lety memorial was established. Topographic survey detected what are very likely to be surface remains of graves, which were also determined by geophysical survey, proving the location of the camp cemetery.

Research activities were broadly presented to the experts and the public, including Roma organizations (including the Committee for the Redress of the Romani Holocaust and Romea; reports on the field research elicited a high level of public/ media response in July 2017) and to government representatives (especially the Ministry of Culture and Minister of Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Legislation). An expert committee was convened at the site on 14 July, consisting of archaeologists, historians and national heritage representatives. As regards the research findings, the committee strongly recommended that action should be taken to declare this site a cultural monument. The research findings were immediately communicated to the Ministry of Culture, which asked for consultation due to the planned purchase of the pig farm by the state and intention to establish the Lety Camp Memorial. If the governmental endeavour is a success, ongoing archaeological research may focus on other parts of the camp area. The priority in 2018 may be the effort to provide a complex picture of its material remains which can subsequently be used for designing any memorials which may be planned.

Pavel Vařeka and Zdenka Vařeková (University of West Bohemia Plzen)
‘Dissonant heritage’ has become the shibboleth of critical heritage studies with regard to the enormous heritage of Europe’s painful and shameful past. Interestingly, in his 2017 plenary lecture on the social and conceptual challenges for a new multidisciplinary generation of heritage scholars at the fourth Heritage Forum in Krakow, John Tunbridge reminded us that when he and Greg Ashworth coined this term in 1996 they were not referring to a special kind of heritage but to something all heritage has in common.¹ Taken from musicology, the notion of dissonances was, in other words, not restricted to difficult heritage and competing memories (as addressed in the other plenary lectures by Sharon Macdonald and me). Instead, it pointed to the immanently conflictual nature of cultural heritage, which is almost always used by different interest groups and users for an appropriation of the past by a consumption of places. Precisely because of this plurality of interests, cultural heritage scores highly on the European agenda for cultural integration and social cohesion. Maybe this explains why in the absence of political unification, cultural heritage sites and heritage tourism function today as the strongest, perhaps even the only, bottom-up engine of Europeanization.² But what heritage managers never forget, is that “you can never sell your heritage to visitors, only their heritage back to them in your locality”³. Thus the commodified touristic past is often brand-new instead of age-old, being experienced by tourists as exciting – or frightening such as in dark tourism experiences – only to become

mastered and domesticated by visitors as their own heritage. This “tourist-resident dialectic” affects also the many battles about contested pasts. For what tourists like to visit in a “Europe of the cities” is not the heritage of residents but the treasures of mankind or, by contrast, the biggest atrocities associated with Europe’s shameful past.4

That even Auschwitz and other ‘negative’ heritage sites may communicate the inclusive values of a shared European past has since long become axiomatic to European integration policies. Such a packaging of the past, however, also triggers more gloomy, exclusive statements of othering. Heritage sites have many ‘friends’ for whom the notion of hospitality is subordinate to that of identity – because how could ‘their’ national, ethnic and cultural, let alone painful, heritage at the same time be that of others? Yet we all use heritage to construct our history, culture and identity. Even though I would not endorse Walter Benjamin’s critical statement that all heritage is the sum of past victories and present robberies,5 the fabrication of heritage revolves around the decontextualization, reconstruction and (re)appropriation of things and places. The Polish-French historian Krzysztof Pomian used the term semiophores for those artifacts that offer their owners (or visitors) tangible links with a past and which open up an invisible, intangible realm of an often forgotten or a poorly understood world.6 Seemingly fixed in time by the politics of preservation, there is hardly anything more fluid and dynamic than such heritage experiences. And more than anything else, this cultural heritage paradox is reflected in the current role played by memorial sites located at many of Europe’s mid-20th century former killing fields and concentration camps. For what these former terrorscapes show to visitors is a domesticated past, where atrocities are experienced and lessons learned within the limits of authorized heritage discourses centered around notions of authenticity, preservation and truth-finding.7 In almost all European countries one or more iconic camps are today preserved as such semiophores of Europe’s terrible, nationalist past, selling the wish of ‘Never again!’ to tourists, families, and school children. Thus even as a heritage of loss, cultural heritage still acts as a mode of production, changing spaces into places by means of a politics of signification and identification.

Probably no-one would have believed a few decades ago that some of Europe’s most frightening terrorscapes would have been turned by the end of the century into memorials to the Holocaust. Yet what happens if sites do not have such an iconic aura of global, national or communal identity that appeals to postwar generations that grew up in a moral climate of historical injustice and the ‘guilt of nations’?8 While the traces of the twentieth-century World Wars and mass atrocities might be successfully staged as tourist experiences on a quickly growing scale, visitors are at the same time expected to identify with universal victims without being disturbed by the historical complexity of real victims, such as communist Jews, or of ‘collaborating’ ethnic minorities, who might also be framed today as perpetrators or ‘terrorists’. What if local people, or hegemonic communities, do not understand their complex and often contested histories, and will not identify with unwanted victims not regarded as their own? Could such camps come to exist as cultural heritage sites without a meaningful context outside the universalizing human rights discourse and the trope of victimhood? And would it be possible for forgotten or contested sites to generate shared meanings and accessibility to future inheritors, such as new inhabitants, generations or minorities, without evoking traumatic memories among older memorial communities?

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This photo of my Czech colleague Pavel Vařeka on a fieldtrip in 2016 with our HERA iC-ACCESS research team to such an unwanted Second World War heritage site shows precisely what heritage managers try to avoid and keep out of site. This fenced off pig farm with the appearance of an industrial plant producing dangerous chemicals, displaying many warning signs against vandals (and memory activists) in a small village in Czech Bohemia, has become the center of one of the most sorrowful conflicts on the legacy of the Holocaust. It concerns the former forced labor and Roma camp (Zigeunerlager) Lety, where from August 1942 to May 1943 at least 1,300 Roma were imprisoned, of whom more than 300 died at this site, while many others were killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Even though some trials against Czech guards took place directly after the War, not one was sentenced. Lety was then soon forgotten.

Archaeologist Pavel Vařeka at the entrance to industrial pig farm in Lety, September 2016. Photo by Rob van der Laarse.

Whereas Czech Romani were treated relatively well under communism,9 since 1989 they have again become subjected to discriminatory legislation and to racism by right-wing skinheads. It was only in 1995, following foreign press attention, that president Vaclav Havel – the poet, writer and Charta 77 dissident, who became a symbol of the global human rights movement in the 1990s – unveiled a remembrance stone near some mass graves outside the fences, promising the immediate closure of the pig farm for which he was internationally praised. For Havel, this Nazi German Holocaust site of “forgotten victims” on occupied Czech territory was a national place of shame. After the ‘heritagization’ of the martyred town Lidice (destroyed by the Nazis in revenge for the Czech assassination of Reinhard Heydrich) and the Nazi-German concentration camp Theresienstadt (Terezín), Lety seemed well on the way to becoming the third pillar of the Czech Holocaust paradigm. Welcomed as a contribution to the Roma struggle for human rights, Havel’s shame was, however, deeply rooted in Czech patriotism. This was soon experienced by the American poet, writer and human rights activist Paul Polansky, whose articles on Lety survivors in the early 1990s played an important role in the Czech decision to erect a monument. Yet the president completely ignored Polansky during the memorial ceremony of 1995 to which he was initially not even invited. After Polansky found out that most of the 40,000 files on Lety were no longer accessible in the public archives, he was forced to work as an oral historian and won the trust of the last Lety survivors, who living according to Romani code had never told their stories to gadjos. Polansky published his book Block Silence (1998) in their name as an indictment of the Czech government, while a year later, when he was already working for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and had become head of the Kosovo Roma

Refugee Foundation, he also challenged the false notion that the Czechs were only a victim nation in his novel *The Storm* (1999). 10

What these dissonances show is that to Havel the case of Lety as a Nazi-German concentration camp, where most prisoners died from typhus, was closely framed in terms of national victimhood. Polansky, instead, framed Lety in terms of Czech perpetration. According to a Czech law of 1939, Lety was established as a disciplinary working camp for “a-socials”. During the first two years, the internees were tramps and vagabonds, but after the registration and deportation of entire Romani families on the order of the collaborating Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Lety was changed into a “gypsy death camp”. After losing their jobs and being robbed of their properties, Czech Romani were treated much worse than the former non-gypsy inmates by local Bohemian guards, who even surpassed the Nazis in sadism. In contrast to what the official story claims, according to Polansky’s witness testimonies, mass graves were dug not for victims of typhus but of terror. Many Roma slave laborers (together with Jews from Terezin) were forced to work themselves to death in the 10,000 hectares of forests belonging to Count Schwarzenberg. In his 1995 speech, Havel did mention the Czech police guarding the prisoners and their exploitation as a cheap labour force by Czech people living in the neighbourhood, but omitted the Schwarzenberg forest. 11 Actually, it was the well-known ex-chairman

10 Paul Polansky, Black Silence: The Lety Survivors Speak, Prague 1998. According to USHMM with 40,000 documents in Trebon and another 90,000 in the state archives in Prague, the Bohemian Roma camp Lety was the best documented in the history of the Holocaust. A Prague assistant was able to make copies in the archives, and regarded the thousands of Roma on the arrival lists of 1942-1943 as more reliable than the (covered-up?) official number of 1100-1300 prisoners in each of Czechoslovakia’s Roma concentration camps. The other camp, Honodin in Moravia, has recently become a part of the Roma Memorial Centre, an institution that is expected in the nearby future to take over the management of Lety from Lidice memorial site.


Yet why has the farm not been removed in all those years? After Lety had changed from a symbol of Czech victimhood into one of perpetration, the removal of the farming company had been dropped from the political agenda. Having grown from 5,000 pigs in 1989 to around 20,000 in the late 1990s, it was even listed by the European community as a model company and the Czech authorities refused to sanction its closure because of the economic impact on the region. I find it interesting to compare this way of coming to terms with the Nazi past with that of neighboring Poland. Both countries have their betrayal myths: Poland its 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Czech Republic the 1938 ‘Munich Betrayal’, even though the role of betrayer is reserved for Chamberlain instead of Stalin. Poland too had its ‘Lety’ in the case of Jedwabne and a Polish-American muckraker in the role of the historian Jan Tomasz Gross. His provocative publication *Neighbors* (2000; English translation 2001) forced president Aleksander Kwaśniewski to acknowledge Polish responsibility and Cardinal Józef Glemp to issue an apology for the Polish pogrom of 10 July 1941, which was wrongly believed to have been a Nazi atrocity. Just like in Poland, the human rights ‘pedagogy of shame’ is replaced in the Czech Republic today by a ‘pedagogy of pride’. Both

countries have redefined themselves as double victims of Nazism and
Communism in accordance with the so-called Prague Declaration of
2008 on the crimes of communism and decades of Soviet occupation.
One may understand that under the moral weight of such geopolitical
extremes, authorized even by the European Parliament and many other
international forums, dark pages in their own histories, such as the 1938
Polish-Czech border conflicts on the Olza River and the behavior of
Polish and Czech ‘neighbors’ against Jews and Roma, lost their former
priority. The nationalist current Polish government has been intensely
working against the notion of Polish guilt, “as victims are by definitions no
perpetrators”, Anna Bikont’s critical comment put it. 13

Turning back to the photo of our visit, we may look somewhat more
carefully to the historic picture of the Roma camp. It shows a square
site with small, linked family barracks which almost look a bit like gypsy
wagons, quite different from the standard German model as described
in Robert Jan van Pelt in this issue, and completely different from the
large stables of the pig farm. The other picture shows a map of this
1970s communist collective farm, which has now been privatized but
still occupies the Lety domain behind the fences. Yet one can easily
understand how in the 1990s the industrialized farm was believed to
be a continuation of the camp. Although barracks from former Nazi
concentration camps – such as those in Westerbork in the Netherlands
– have been re-used as farm stables, among other things, it might have
been the indexical link to the past which under the loaded prisoners/pigs
association turned this site of trauma into such a haunted place. 14 For the

entire time, the pig farm was believed to have been built right upon the
campscape until an American photographer hired a plane in 2007 to fly
over the Lety domain and took a photo with the “Schwarzenberg pond”
as a reference point. It was here, according to Polansky, that many Roma
children were drowned by the guards. After comparing the aerial photo
with a Second World War map of Lety it became clear however that only
one corner of the farm corresponded with the camp. 15 When ‘Lety’ was
placed under the supervision of Lidice memorial site in 2010, some three
barracks were reconstructed near the remembrance site together with
a stone modelscape and a walking route around the domain. Lety then
started to become a heritage site.

So today the pigs cover a difficult past that might be unearthed by
forensic and non-invasive archaeological research, such as our HERA
project Accessing Campscapes proposes. While research has been
hampered by authorized narratives of Czech victimhood and the
inaccessibility of the site, such difficulties might also be regarded as an
implicit recognition of the mnemonic power of place. For the contestation
of difficult heritage actually keeps it alive. It is therefore not unlikely
that renewed international pressure, student and Roma activism, and
local and national interests, might produce a different outcome than in
the past. After years of protest by NGOs like Human Right Watch and
Amnesty International (that presented a petition with nearly 100,000
signatures against the ethnic segregation of almost a third of Romani
children routinely placed into schools for the mentally disadvantaged), in
2014 the European Commission initiated an unprecedented procedure
against the Czech Republic based on EU anti-discrimination legislation,
while in September 2017 the government announced serious steps to

13 Anna Bikont quoted in Pieter van Os, Polen die Joden hadden gered, hielden dat geheim,
Interview, in: NRC-Handelsblad, 23 September 2016. See also Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The De-
struction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, Princeton 2001; Anthony Polonsky and
Joanna B. Michlic (eds.), The Neighbors Respond: The controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in
14 Francesco Mazzucchelli, Rob van der Laarse, and Carlos Reijnen, Introduction: Traces of Terror,
Signs of Trauma, in: Francesco Mazzucchelli, Rob van der Laarse, and Carlos Reijnen (eds.), Traces
of Terror, Signs of Trauma: Practices of (Re)presentation of Collective Memories in Space in Con-
temporary Europe, Milan 2014, 3-19.
15 Polansky, Black Silence, 7.
put an end to the situation. Within two months the Czech government reached an agreement with the owner to buy him out for a price far above the market value. Nonetheless, it is also good to distance ourselves from heated debates around the fate of the pig farm. One may read Vařekas’ account of their recent mapping of the camp in this journal to find out that the postwar plant actually spared the former campscape, whose remains in the ground might be far less disturbed than the peace of the owner. This evokes new questions for future research, of course, including why this terrorscape has actually been preserved for so many decades as a ‘forgotten’ terrorscape by communist and private stakeholders.

Rob van der Laarse (University of Amsterdam)


Unlike the locations of historical events that can be interpreted from a temporal distance, there are certain sites of memory which transcend their historical authenticity and instead seem to be continuously persistent and fundamentally tied to communal life. In the context of Croatian and Southeastern European history, the Jasenovac concentration camp is an example of a “past that does not pass”. As a contested and simultaneously iconic lieu de mémoire, Jasenovac embodies an important idea of something historical which cannot be seen solely as a history, but rather contains something beyond ‘ordinary history’; it possesses a different nature, something provoking strong emotional responses. Its particular importance could be ascribed not only to the extent of suffering endured by its victims when the camp was still operational, but also to the role it plays in the collective remembrance of both Croats and Serbs, other neighbouring countries, and of Jewish diasporas worldwide. During the war, Jasenovac was the largest complex of concentration, incarceration, forced labour and extermination camps in the Independent State of Croatia (NDHi), where between 1941 and 1945 the Croatian Ustaše brutally slaughtered Serbs, Roma, Jews, and Croats opposing the Ustaše regime. And yet, the collective trauma of Jasenovac is largely rooted in the fact that no common memory has been formed by the various ethnic and national groups whose forebears were killed in the camp. Emerging from disagreements over historical interpretations, recurring questions about the forms of commemoration and the conflicts arising from the collective memories of Croats, Serbs, Jews and Roma, render Jasenovac a genuinely controversial and contested place of remembering, whose past is very much alive in the present.

Throughout the history of the camp and of the memorial, Jasenovac has served as a theatre of national conflicts and misappropriations, especially with regard to manipulations pertaining to the number of victims. Until today, the number of fatalities at the Jasenovac camp remains the most contentious issue and is still unresolved. Lists of the names of victims from both Yugoslavia and Croatia in the Second World War created by various governmental bodies in Yugoslavia often differ considerably, and fall within an excessively broad range from complete minimization to megalomaniacal claims. Even though the list of victims created by the Jasenovac Memorial Site consists of 83,145 names, extremist Croatian nationalism still finds incentives for a revisionist downsizing of the number of victims to a few thousand, including claims that Jasenovac was merely a labour camp rather than a site of mass killings. Serbian nationalists, in turn, still tend to highly overstate the number of victims of Jasenovac, referring to 700,000 deaths – a number scaled up in

2 The camp consisted of 5 subcamps. Although gas chambers were not operated in Jasenovac and the camp complex functioned in a way different to the extermination centres at Belzec, Sobibor or Treblinka, over 80,000 of its inmates were systematically exterminated in mass executions. Excessively heavy forced labour and malnutrition were also used as extermination methods at the camp.
5 The public revisionist debate around Jasenovac in Croatia is most salient in parts of Catholic communities. One of the most recent debates was inspired by an interview in which the head of the Archdiocese Archives in Zagreb, Dr. Stjepan Razum, claimed that Jasenovac was not an extermination camp but merely a labour and temporary transit camp. In the same interview, he added that there was no proof of mass executions in Jasenovac during WWII but that there are indications of post-war executions conducted by the communists. This pattern of historical revisionism, which denies WWII crimes at Jasenovac, is institutionalized through an association named the Society for Investigating These Jasenovac Camps (Društvo za istraživanje trostrukog logora Jasenovac). See HR Svijet, Dr. Stjepan Razum: Nema dokaza za masovne ustaške zločine u Jasenovcu, ali ima za partizanski. http://www.brsvijet.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33778:stjepan-razum-skrivanje-istine-o-beogradskom-konz-logoru-i-nametanje-lai-o-jasenovcu&catid=74:knjigozori&Itemid=348 (accessed 1 October 2017).
estimates of the Serbian victims of the war (more than one million) made in the 1980s. In an even more problematic vein, Serbian historical textbooks also maintain that 500,000 - 600,000 people were killed at Jasenovac.\(^6\)

In order to understand why Jasenovac is contentious on the historical and symbolic level, the complex interplay of wider national and ethnic developments throughout Croatian history, both before and after the Second World War, should be taken into account. After the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918), of which Croatia was part, it had merged into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941), the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Even before the outbreak of the Second World War, the Kingdom was torn by cross-ethnic conflicts and was constantly on the edge of collapse. Hitler succeeded in occupying it in just 11 days. With the support of the Axis powers, the collaborationist NDH was established in April 1941 on the territory of present-day Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, partially, Serbia. The Jasenovac camp was the site of many of the crimes committed by the Ustaše, a radical Croat nationalist movement led by Ante Pavelić, developed during his exile in Italy in the 1930s and sanctioned by Hitler and Mussolini. The Ustaše carried out the ‘local’ Holocaust against Jews and Roma [in the NDH] as well as genocide against Serbs (who account for the most deaths in the NDH), and political crimes against Croat antifascists and other opponents of Ustaše racial ideology.

\(^6\) The most prominent authors of the thesis of 700,000 Jasenovac victims were Milan Bulajić and Antun Miletić. See Milan Bulajić, Ustaški zločini genocida i suđenje Andriji Artukoviću 1986. Godine, Vol. 1-4, Beograd: 1986/1987. Furthermore, Vojislav K. Stojanović, a close ally of Slobodan Milosevic’s politics and the president of the Association of University Professors and Scientists of Serbia (Udruženje sveučilišnih profesora i znanstvenika Srbije), claimed in February 1991 that ‘in the crime of genocide perpetrated by the Croatian ultranationalists, the Serbian nation lost over two million innocent victims simply because they were Serbs’. Quoted in Ozren Žunec, Goli život I, Demetra, 2007, 399-400.
Vjeran Pavlakovic and Mila Dragojevic rightly observe that the Second World War on the territory of the NDH and Yugoslavia was not a clear-cut struggle between foreign occupiers and a revolutionary guerrilla movement. It could be better described as a multisided civil war. The Ustaše terror, its extreme violence, mass arrests and persecutions of rival ethnic and religious groups directly fuelled subsequent uprisings. By the end of the war, the majority of Croats had also joined the resistance movement led by the Communist party and Josip Broz Tito. After his victory in May 1945, the new Yugoslavia was established as a Socialist Federation. In the immediate postwar years (1945-1948), the state adopted a harsh Soviet-style economic model and equally harsh methods of dealing with political opponents, who were sent to prisons or concentration camps. Yet after the Tito-Stalin (Yugoslav-Soviet) split in 1948, and the end of the subsequent Informbiro period in 1955, the country developed a distinct state socialist system. It witnessed unusually high levels of civil liberties and high economic growth. Nevertheless, Tito’s regime was based on a highly centralised commemorative culture, which exerted strong control over the official narrative of the war. Jasenovac came to symbolize the glorious antifascist struggle, captured in the slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity”.

As a result of divergent war experiences, traumas and losses suffered during the war and its immediate aftermath, various citizens’ groups in Yugoslavia perceived this deeply politically inflected concept in very different ways. In official discourse, however, it captured first and foremost the antifascist partisan struggle, and implied recognition and honouring of only one victim group: political opponents of the Ustaše regime. At the same time, those who died “on the other side” were marginalized and downplayed. This pertained also to civilian victims of the Ustaše regime and those of interethnic violence. Aimed at silencing Croat-Serb hostilities, which had found their most brutal expression at the Jasenovac camp during the war, the state’s politics of memory built upon a rigid and selective remembrance marked by an intentional blurring of the identities of both victims and perpetrators. Soon after Tito’s death in 1980, the idea of “Brotherhood and Unity”, which defined the Jasenovac narrative, began to dissolve – a fact that served to antagonize rather than to unify. The late 1980s saw nationalism gradually becoming the dominant political ideology in the Yugoslav republics, something that was epitomized in the aggressive politics of Slobodan Milosevic.

This political context allowed the legacy of the Second World War to become a prime subject of manipulation. The promotion of selective readings of the past – especially those pertaining to Jasenovac camp – and a rewriting of the number of its victims played an important role in the identity politics behind the war in Croatia in the 1990s (Croatia’s ‘Homeland War’). According to Vjeran Pavlakovic, the state socialist suppression of historical truths, manipulation of memories, and their role in reawakening fears and hostilities tamed after the Second World War, could, to some extent, be considered one causal factor of the wars that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Its aftermath has, nevertheless, not resulted in a process of coming to terms with national pasts critically. As the cornerstone of the official Yugoslav narrative, the antifascist struggle has been gradually challenged or even denied while nationalist narratives have begun to proliferate. Conflicting memories of victims of mutual violence (perpetrated by the Ustaše, Partisans, or Chetniks) are effectively being silenced again.

Shaped by its relentless hold on unresolved national pasts that still haunt the present, Jasenovac continues to have a pervasive presence in

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Croatian and Serbian historical, cultural and political discourses. And the very fact that Jasenovac remains the main subject (and trigger) of memory wars defines its historical and symbolic meaning(s). As much as it carries the memory of the Second World War, it also conveys and embodies the many histories of all subsequent periods, from the early postwar years until today. Paradoxically, its decades-long role as a symbol of antifascist struggle, which resulted in serious constraints on historical investigations into the crimes perpetrated at the camp between 1941 and 1945, and the propagandistic rounding up of numbers of its victims (initially, in order to justify repatriation requests from Germany), transformed Jasenovac into a symbol of manipulation and division. This plays out in the cruel ‘number games’ that until this day fuel conflicts between Croats and Serbs – in the Milosevic era, the latter made direct political use of the early postwar count that was never scientifically verified and declared all 700,000 Jasenovac victims as Serbs. The camp was thus framed as a reference point for past and present collective losses and suffering inflicted by the Croats. This is foregrounded to an even greater degree by the spatial division of the terrain of the former camp, located on two sides of the River Sava – a national border established in 1990, which nowadays draws the boundary between Croatia and Republika Srpska, a predominantly Serbian part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the accession of Croatia to the European Union in 2013, this border further separates, politically and symbolically, the 28th EU member state from the other countries in the former Yugoslavia.

Located on two sides of the River Sava and framed by two distinct, physically separated memorial landscapes – the Jasenovac Memorial Site in Croatia and Donja Gradina Memorial in Bosnia – the space of the former camp consequently embodies the excess of meanings attached to Jasenovac, where conflicting and irreconcilable narratives proliferate. On the Croatian side, in an area almost devoid of material remains of the camp that was made into a memorial site as early as 1968, there is a permanent museum exhibition that opened in 2006, which centres
around a list of individual names of Jasenovac victims. Based on the concept of “the victim as an individual”, it displays 277 glass boards inscribed with personal details of 83,145 individuals identified to date. Established in the 1980s, the Donja Gradina Memorial, in turn, brings to the fore the mass character of death that unfolded at the camp. The memorial landscape encapsulates the biggest mass killing and mass burial site of the Jasenovac complex, with more than 150 marked and unmarked graves, which still contain human remains. The on-site museum provides detailed accounts of atrocities committed at the site. Until today, the boards placed in the central area of the memorial inform visitors that 700,000 people were murdered at the camp.

These two radically different spatial and museological approaches to the camp could be considered reflections of dominant, historically and culturally specific ways of framing mass political violence: while the first builds upon the approach developed in/for victim-oriented contemporary ‘Western’ Holocaust museums, the second immediately brings to mind strategies employed at the concentration and extermination camps of Treblinka, Auschwitz-Birkenau, or Majdanek. Yet in the politics behind both – the individualization of death at the Jasenovac memorial site, which ensures that the focus on the victims somewhat eclipses the attention paid to (Croatian) perpetrators, and its ‘massification’ at Donja Gradina, which forefronts mass violence perpetrated at the camp and to a certain extent blurs distinctions between various victim groups – prove all but innocent. Instead, they embody and further perpetuate the ambiguity of the persistent and unresolved past that clings to Jasenovac.

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THROUGH THE CITY OF CAMPS: REMEMBERING FORCED LABOUR IN BERLIN

During the Second World War, Berlin was not only the capital of the Third Reich, but also the centre of Nazi forced labour. Half a million men, women and children were forced to work in factories, workshops, offices and private households in Berlin – far more than in any other city in occupied Europe. Among them were over 380,000 civilians, over 70,000 prisoners of war, around 10,000 concentration camp prisoners and – until they were deported – over 20,000 Jewish Berliners.1 The forced labourers worked in ammunitions production, but also for the railway and postal services, in workshops and in churches. Kept separate from the Volksgemeinschaft, they lived among Berliners in over 3000 sites of accommodation: barrack camps and restaurants, schools and coal cellars. The police, Wehrmacht, employment office, factory security and SS placed the forced labourers under a strict, racist and bureaucratic rule. North and West Europeans were at the top, while East Europeans, Roma and Jews were at the bottom of the Nazis’ racial hierarchy. From heavy labour, hunger and poor hygiene standards, the predominantly young workers often became ill: tuberculosis and typhus were widespread. Usually not allowed inside the shelters, they were defenceless against the daily bombings. Thus, over 10,000 forced labourers died and were buried in Berlin.

For decades, governments and companies have refused – with very few exceptions – any kind of financial compensation. Not until the 1990s did local initiatives begin to create awareness about the ubiquity of the camps and the individual fates of the forced labourers in Germany during the war. With the opening of borders in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, survivors also began to share their personal memories; only then could researchers and local memory workers invite them for an interview or a personal encounter with school students or local politicians. The growth of this localised memory boom was bolstered by US-sponsored compensation claims in the late 1990s. Between 1998 and 2000, boycott threats and legal class actions in the US forced the German state and industry to set up the foundation Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft which from 2001 to 2007 made a one-time payment of between 500 and 7700 euros to certain groups of former forced labourers, depending on the circumstances of their persecution.

The emerging localised memory of forced labour was also part of a broader change in Berlin’s culture of remembrance. Since the 1980s, new memorials have been erected, with abstract monuments giving way to more detailed, personalised and site-specific information plaques. Artistic interventions explored the potential of multi-sited, less visible, and spatially and temporally fragmented forms of memorials. Research groups focused on the realities of what National Socialism meant in one’s own local neighbourhood, while also soliciting oral testimonies from Jewish and other victims of the Nazi dictatorship. Inspired by the 50th anniversary of the Nazi rise to power in 1983 and the activities surrounding the 750th anniversary of Berlin in 1987, many counter-events were based on the localized approach of “Dig where you stand”, including the excavation of the foundations of Gestapo headquarters, which ultimately led to the Topography of Terror museum that was unveiled 23 years later in 2010.

As a result of these dedicated of initiatives, school teachers, amateur historians, and antifascist groups, more than 20 commemorative plaques and memorials relating to Nazi forced labour were erected in Berlin.2


2 Cord Pagenstecher, Orte des Gedenkens: Die nationalsozialistische Zwangsarbeit im deutschen Geschichtsbild, in: Andreas Heusler, Mark Spoerer, Helmuth Trischler (eds.), Rüstung, Kriegswirt-

One of the first ‘official’ commemorative plaques for Polish forced labourers was inaugurated in 1995 at a former AEG factory building in the Wedding district of Berlin. Sharing memories meant also creating communities. In Berlin-Neukölln, about 30 mostly Lutheran parishes from all over Berlin had operated a common camp for over 100 Ostarbeiter who were employed as gravediggers. After receiving a letter from a survivor, some church activists started a research and commemoration project; each parish has one part of this monument in its church and takes part in a shared memorial ceremony once a year. Elsewhere, school projects have mapped camps and theatre groups have read out forced labourers’ testimonies on stage. No tourist will ever find the little hand-made monument created by allotment gardeners at the entrance to their community, hidden behind a petrol station in the south-eastern Adlershof district. Using concrete remnants of the shower barracks, this hand-built monument aims to remember the huge Adlergestell camp, which once housed about 3000 forced labourers from the Soviet Union. Initiated and realised by the elderly gardeners without any public involvement, such a grassroots monument in the city’s periphery does not figure in tourists’ or journalists’ or historians’ spatial imagination of Berlin.

The initiatives of the Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt (Berlin History Workshop), a grassroots association studying local and oral history, tracing women’s and minorities’ (in)visible traces in urban heritage, have played a critical role in making the locations of forced labour ‘visible’ again. This association was also instrumental in preserving one of the last remaining forced labour camps in Berlin, which was ‘discovered’ in 1994 in the working class district Berlin-Schöneeweide and, later on, transformed into Dokumentationszentrum NS-Zwangsarbeit (Nazi forced labour documentation centre). Even today, the ensemble of barracks amongst a residential neighbourhood houses a car repair shop, a day-care centre, a sauna, a restaurant and other mundane facilities. Built in 1943 by the General Building Inspector for the Reich Capital, under the direction of Albert Speer, it is one of the last well-preserved former Nazi forced labour camps in Europe. After many years of lobbying, a commemorative plaque was erected in 2001, while in 2006 the memorial museum was opened. In 2012, the Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt handed over its archival collection on Nazi forced labour to the Documentation Centre and in 2013 a new permanent exhibition was inaugurated.

Also in 2013, the memories of forced labourers came alive on the streets of Berlin. For those with a smartphone to hand, the Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt has developed a multimedia testimony app about forced labour in Nazi Berlin funded by the Hauptstadtkulturfonds (Capital 3

Culture Fund) and the foundation Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future. The Forced Labour app, available for iOS and Android phones in German and English, enables its users to explore the traces of these involuntary Berliners and listen to their narratives. It encourages tourists and locals to follow in the footsteps of former forced labourers who lived and worked in Berlin. As the advertisement for the app explains: “Witnesses tell of factories and camps. Photos and documents show both victims and perpetrators.”

Five tours highlight the personal stories of forced labour survivors as tied to particular parts of the city, focusing on different themes: The walking tour “A Pole in Berlin” concentrates on the biography of Józef Przedpełski, who was forced to work for the railway and was housed in a school building turned into a forced labour camp. The “Victims and Perpetrators” walking tour begins at Brandenburg Gate and visits the perpetrators’ desks along Wilhelmstrasse. The “In the Factory” walking tour focuses on two AEG factories in Berlin-Gesundbrunnen. The cycling tour “Forced Labour was Everywhere” starts at Potsdamer Platz and documents the everyday life of forced labourers in the districts of Kreuzberg, Tempelhof and Neukölln. The S-Bahn tour “Through the City of Camps” proceeds from Berlin Zoo station to the Schöneweide Documentation Centre, drawing attention to the encounters between forced labourers and Germans on their way through the city.

The testimony app created by Berliner Geschichtswerkstatt is based on the association’s long-standing expertise in research and dissemination of local and oral history. Over three decades, it has developed two activist approaches to communicating the significance of the past in the present day: encounters with survivors and searching for traces in the neighbourhood. With the digital technology of a smartphone app, this project now combines both approaches by localising the testimonies and narrating the local traces. As distinct from other history apps that offer city tours with illustrated texts at particular sites, the Forced Labour app connects first-hand accounts with historical sources to provide the user with both a rich personal and factual context to explore particular places and the city. Indeed, the survivors’ narratives are at the heart of the project. Most personal testimonies come from a special collection that the Berlin History Workshop developed between 1995 and 2010, as one of the first documented archives of forced labourers. The app also draws upon the Forced Labour 1939-1945 interview archive developed at Freie Universität Berlin.

Tourists, students and residents can download the app to their smartphone to discover places and learn about the city in ways not highlighted in guidebooks. At well-known spots, such as Wilhelmstrasse, as well as at more mundane buildings, such as factory halls or train stations, forgotten histories can be investigated. Eyewitness accounts of the former forced labourers are highlighted through short excerpts of video and audio interviews or written accounts spoken aloud. Personal photos, documents and other pieces of memorabilia are also provided. While most of the eyewitnesses came from Eastern Europe, including 16 from Poland, there are some Western Europeans as well, such as the late French journalist, caricaturist and novelist François Cavanna, whose observations are described in his 1979 autobiographical novel Les Russkoffs. Each station included in the app includes a short overview of the historical context.

At particular places, the app user listens to the life experiences of forced labourers that describe humiliation and hope, despair and rebellion, as well as friendship and love, often at the very places where these emotions were experienced. For example, the user might be standing at

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the Brandenburg Gate when listening to former Polish forced labourer Alina Przybyła stating: "I was 13 when I was in Berlin, but I remember everything ... I can hardly recognise anything today, the city has changed so much. I only recognised Brandenburg Gate, where I stood at the time and scratched into one of the columns: ‘Little horse, bring me away from here, back to Mum!’" In today’s crowd of shoppers at Alexanderplatz, the user listens to Raissa Stepiko’s narration of trying to get a loaf of bread on the black market at the same site. The seemingly calm present becomes confronted with the stories of a dramatic past: in the midst of the tourist hustle and bustle at Alexanderplatz, the voice of a survivor describes what it was like to experience the chaotic last days of the war, running from hunger as well as the artillery fire. Building upon the ability of new digital tools to open new ways to an independent perceiving and remembering of urban history and heritage, the app and the memories it conveys reveal hidden histories, awaken a visitor’s curiosity and give a new meaning to places otherwise taken for granted in the city.

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